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JURISDICTION IN SINGLE CONTRACT CASES
Timothy D. Brewer
INTRODUCTION
In 1945 the United States Supreme Court caused an upheaval
in the law of in personam jurisdiction with its decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington.I That decision approved the exercise
by a state court of in personam jurisdiction over a defendant which
was not physically present within the state.2 Unfortunately, Interna-
tional Shoe left undefined the extent to which in personam jurisdic-
tion over non-residents might be exercised.
With the increase in ease of transportation and communication
has come an increase in interstate commerce. A jurisdictional ques-
tion has developed around contracts negotiated by residents of dif-
ferent states. The contracts may have been negotiated by mail,
telephone, or telegraph without either party ever physically entering
the other's home state. The exercise of jurisdiction in cases arising
from breaches of such contracts raises questions left undecided by
International Shoe. This article discusses those questions and seeks
to provide guidance in answering them. First, though, a brief re-
view of the development of the law of in personam jurisdiction
should be made.
HISTORICAL REVIEW OF IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION
At common law the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant
required either physical power over his person or his voluntary ap-
1. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2. Id. at 320.
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pearance.3 The execution of a judgment likewise required the
seizure of the defendant's person or property.4 From this basis
American courts developed a territorial approach to jurisdiction
which recognized jurisdiction only if the defendant received service
of process within the geographic territory of the court or if he con-
sented to the exercise of jurisdiction. This territorial approach to
jurisdiction was adopted by the United States Supreme Court in
1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff.5
Pennoyer involved an ejectment action brought by Neff to re-
move Pennoyer from land located in Oregon. Pennoyer claimed ti-
tle to the land under a sheriff's deed acquired at an execution sale.
The sale had been held to enforce a default judgment acquired by
one Mitchell against Neff while Neff had been outside of Oregon.
Service in Mitchell's action against Neff had been by publication in
an Oregon newspaper. The United States Supreme Court ruled the
default judgment invalid because Neff had been outside Oregon at
the time of the judgment's entry and had not been served with pro-
cess within the state.6 The Court clearly stated the territorial theory
of jurisdiction:
And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle,
that the laws of one state have no operation outside of its terri-
tory, except so far as is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal
established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as
to subject either persons or property to its decisions.7
The territorial theory's reliance upon physical presence and
consent did not provide a sufficiently broad basis of in personam
jurisdiction. Expansion of the basis of jurisdiction necessarily fol-
lowed. The first expansion came with the allowance of jurisdiction
over domiciliaries who were absent from the forum state and were
served with process outside of the forum state.8 The duty to respond
to suits was viewed as part of the price of the rights and benefits of
domicile.9
3. See McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Michigan Trust Company v. Ferry,
228 U.S. 346 (1913). See also, Dodd, Jurisdiction in Personal Actions, 23 ILL. L. REv. 427
(1929); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Fo-
rum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956).
4. See McDonald and Michigan Trust Company, supra note 3.
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
6. Id. at 734.
7. Id. at 722.
8. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). See also Blackmer v. United States, 284
U.S. 421 (1932).
9. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. at 463-64.
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The expansion of jurisdictional bases continued with the devel-
opment of the theory of implied consent. Under this theory a de-
fendant, by acting within the forum state, was held to have
consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over him. This theory was
first applied to corporations based on the conducting of business in
the forum state.'0 Later the implied consent theory was expanded to
include individuals." The implied consent of individuals, like that
of corporations, arose from their actions within the forum state.' 2
For corporations the implied consent theory was carried a step
further. The transacting of business by a corporation within a state
was eventually viewed as making that corporation actually "pres-
ent" within that state.' 3 This theory rejected an earlier view of cor-
porations as being located only in their state of incorporation.' 4
The strict territorial theory of jurisdiction stated in Pennoyer
had thus been substantially weakened prior to the International
Shoe decision. While not expressly overruling Pennoyer, Interna-
tional Shoe effectively ended the territorial theory of jurisdiction
and replaced it with a more flexible standard based on minimum
contacts. '5
International Shoe was an action brought by the State of Wash-
ington against a Delaware corporation to collect unpaid contribu-
tions to the state unemployment compensation fund.' 6  The
corporation maintained no offices in Washington. It did, however,
dispatch salesmen to the state to solicit orders. The orders were
transmitted to St. Louis, Missouri, where they were accepted by the
corporation. The company then shipped the goods to the purchasers
in Washington. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that this
course of conduct was sufficient to constitute doing business in the
state and to make the corporation subject to the state's jurisdiction. "
The United States Supreme Court noted that courts no longer
needed physical power over the defendant to exercise jurisdiction
over him.'" In place of the Pennoyer requirement of physical pres-
ence the Court stated a new standard:
10. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
11. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
12. Id. at 356-57.
13. Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibben, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
14. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
15. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
16. Id. at 311.
17. Id. at 314.
18. Id. at 316.
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[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to
a judgment inpersonam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."9
Applying this standard the Court found that the corporation
had sufficient contacts with Washington to allow the state to exercise
jurisdiction.20
The language used in International Shoe, while obviously ex-
panding the scope of in personam jurisdiction, was so general that
no firm limits on the expansion could be discerned. A look at the
cases which followed International Shoe is necessary to understand
the decision's impact.
The extent to which International Shoe had expanded jurisdic-
tion became apparent in McGee v. International Lfe Insurance Co. 21
That suit was commenced in California by a beneficiary of a life
insurance policy issued by a Texas corporation to a California resi-
dent. The Texas insurance company had assumed an Arizona in-
surance company's insurance obligations, one of which was a policy
owned by the California resident. The Texas company notified the
California resident of the assumption and issued a new policy to
him in California. The insured continued to pay the insurance pre-
miums by mail from his California home. This was the Texas com-
pany's only contact with California. The California court based its
jurisdiction on a California statute which subjected foreign insur-
ance companies to suit in California on insurance policies with Cali-
fornia residents.22
Noting the trend toward expansion of the permissible scope of
jurisdiction,2 3 the Supreme Court approved the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by California. 2M The Court found that the suit was based on a
contract which had substantial connection with the state.25 The
Court cited the hardship which would be placed on the beneficiaries
if they were forced to litigate in another state.26 Also, the Court
pointed out California's interest in providing redress to its
19. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
20. Id. at 320.
21. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
22. Cal. Ins. Code §§ 1610-1620 (West 1972).
23. 355 U.S. at 222.






The Court's decision in McGee seemed to indicate that the in-
terest of the plaintiff was superior to that of the defendant when
determining jurisdiction. The Court, while noting that the exercise
of jurisdiction placed a burden on the defendant, 28 emphasized that
denying jurisdiction would place a greater burden on the plaintiff.
29
This emphasis on the plaintiff's interest was rejected in Hanson v.
Denckla .30
Hanson involved a dispute over a trust established in Delaware
by a Pennsylvania resident. The settlor later moved to Florida
where she died. The residuary beneficiaries under her will brought
suit in Florida to have the trust invalidated. The trust beneficiaries
subsequently commenced on action in Delaware to have the trust
ruled valid. The residuary beneficiaries received a favorable verdict
in the Florida litigation and pleaded it as a bar to the Delaware
court action. The Delaware court refused to give full faith and
credit to the Florida judgment on the grounds that the Florida court
did not have jurisdiction over the trust or the trustee. The United
States Supreme Court was called upon to decide if the Florida court
had jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Florida court had not had in
personam jurisdiction over the trustee.32 The Court emphasized
that the trustee had done no act in Florida33 nor exercised any privi-
lege there.3 The Court rejected the argument that the settlor's and
beneficiaries' Florida domicile and their actions there were sufficient
to allow jurisdiction over the trustee." The Court emphasized its
focus on the defendant's acts when it stated: "[Ilt is essential in each
case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully
27. Id.
28. Id. at 224.
29. Id. at 223. The Court stated:
These residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were forced to follow the
insurance company to a distant State in order to hold it legally accountable. When
claims were small or moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the
cost of bringing an action in a foreign forum - thus in effect making the company
judgment proof. Often the crucial witnesses - as here on the company's defense of
suicide - will be found in the insured's locality.
Id.
30. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
31. Id. at 238.
32. Id. at 254.
33. Id. at 251.
34. Id. at 252.
35. Id. at 253-54.
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avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."
' a6
This reliance on the defendant's acts and the use of the "pur-
posefully avails" standard was affirmed in Kulko v. Superior
Court. 37 In that suit a New York resident was sued by his ex-wife, a
California resident, in a California state court for modification of
their divorce decree. The divorce had been granted in Haiti and
incorporated a property settlement executed by both parties in New
York. The California court exercised its jurisdiction over the New
York resident because he allowed his daughter to live in California
with her mother. This was viewed as purposefully availing himself
of the benefits and protections of California's laws.38 Additionally,
the California court ruled that the New York resident by his acts
had caused an effect in California so that jurisdiction could be had
under the effects test.39
The Supreme Court ruled that the California court acted im-
properly in exercising jurisdiction.4° The Court found that the New
York resident had derived no benefit from California.4 ' The Court
noted California's interest in protecting its minor residents, but
found that this interest was insufficient to allow jurisdiction.4 2
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson 43 also turned upon
the "purposefully avails" test. The action was brought against the
wholesale and retail sellers of a car that was involved in an accident
in Oklahoma. New York residents had purchased the car in New
York. While moving to Arizona, the owners were injured in the
Oklahoma accident. They commenced a products liability action in
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that although the
retailer's market area extended only into New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut, the retailer did derive benefit from Oklahoma in
36. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
37. 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
38. Id. at 94.
39. Id. at 96. Under the effects test one is subject to the jurisdiction of the forum state if
he has caused effects in the forum state. This is true even if the effects were caused by
actions taken outside the forum state. See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 37 (1971).
40. 436 U.S. at 92.
41. Id. at 96.
42. Id. at 98. The Court also rejected the effects test as a basis for jurisdiction in this
suit. The test was intended to apply either to wrongful acts causing physical injury or prop-
erty damage or to commercial transactions. The New York resident's actions did not fall
within either of these categories and therefore did not bring the effects test into play. Id. at
96-97.
43. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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that its goods were used there. On the basis of this benefit the court
ruled that the retailer was subject to Oklahoma jurisdiction.
44
In reversing this determination, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the retailer had done nothing to avail itself of the benefits of
Oklahoma law.45 The retailer closed no sales, performed no serv-
ices, and carried on no activities of any type in Oklahoma.46 The
Court also rejected an argument that jurisdiction should be permit-
ted because it was foreseeable that the automobile would be used in
Oklahoma. The Court explained:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseeability is wholly ir-
relevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its way
into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct
and connection with the forum State are such that he should rea-
sonably anticipate being haled into court there.
47
Here, the defendants had done nothing which would make it fore-
seeable that they would be haled into Oklahoma's courts.48
World- Wide Volkswagen is the last Supreme Court decision on
in personam jurisdiction, and, thus, the cases from International
Shoe through World- Wide Volkswagen set out the general rules of
in personam jurisdiction. Those decisions, however, will not be the
end to the Supreme Court's work in this area. Too many questions
remain unanswered for the court to retire. 49 Let us now turn to an
investigation of one of those unanswered questions.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONFUSION REMAINING IN
SINGLE CONTRACT CASES
As previously stated in this article, one type of case which has
continued to cause confusion in the exercise of in personam jurisdic-
tion is the single contract case. The single contract case arises from
the breach of a contract between the residents of different states.
Neither party has any contact with the other, or with the other's
home state, except this single contract. The issue in such cases is
whether the home state of one of the contracting parties may exer-
44. Id. at 290-91.
45. Id. at 295.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 297.
48. Id. at 298.
49. See Justice White's dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in Lakeside Bridge &
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
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cise jurisdiction over the nonresident party. This admittedly diffi-
cult issue has resulted in confusing, and conflicting, decisions.
An example of this confusion can be seen in the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' decisions in two recent single contract cases.
The first decision came in Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain
State Construction Co. 5  Lakeside, a Wisconsin corporation,
brought suit in Wisconsin against Mountain State, a West Virginia
corporation. The action arose from an alleged breach of a contract
between Lakeside and Mountain State. Under the contract Lake-
side was to provide Mountain State with materials to be used in a
construction project in Virginia.
Neither corporation had offices or agents in the other's home
state nor had any contact with the other's home state except this
single contract. The negotiation of the contract had been conducted
entirely by telephone and mail except for an initial solicitation by
Lakeside's agents visiting Mountain State's West Virginia office.
The original purchase order was prepared in West Virginia by
Mountain State. Lakeside modified the order at its offices in Wis-
consin and returned it to Mountain State. Mountain State acqui-
esced to the modification.
Lakeside manufactured the materials at its plant in Wisconsin.
The goods were shipped to Mountain State under the following con-
tract terms: "F.O.B. SELLERS PLANT MILWAUKEE, WIS-
CONSIN with freight allowed to rail siding nearest project site." 51
Mountain State accepted the materials and incorporated them into
its construction. It refused, however, to pay the purchase price
claiming that the materials were defective. Lakeside filed suit to re-
cover the purchase price.
The Seventh Circuit ruled that Mountain State was not subject
to in personam jurisdiction in Wisconsin.52 The court's decision
turned heavily on the requirement established in Hanson v. Denckla
that "the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits
and protections of its laws."'5 3 The court ruled that Mountain State
had not availed itself of Wisconsin's benefits and protections by
contracting with a Wisconsin corporation.54
50. 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980).
51. 597 F.2d at 598. The capitalized portion of the shipping term was printed. The
remainder in lower case letters had been added by typewriter.
52. Id. at 604.
53. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253.
54. The court explained its decision as follows:
[Vol. 6:1
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One year after Lakeside, the Seventh Circuit decided another
single contract case, Wisconsin Electrical Manufacturing Co. v. Pen-
nant Products, Inc. 55 Wisconsin Electrical involved the breach of a
contract to purchase a computer system. Pennant, a New York cor-
poration, had first contacted an Ohio corporation, Fred D. Pfening
Company, to acquire the system. Pfening contacted Wisconsin
Electrical, a Wisconsin corporation, to get component parts. Even-
tually, Pfening suggested that Pennant deal directly with Wisconsin
Electrical.
Just as in Lakeside, neither Pennant nor Wisconsin Electrical
maintained offices or agents in the other's home state or had any
contact with the other's home state except this single contract. Also,
all negotiation between the parties took place by telephone or by
mail, except for two visits to Wisconsin by Pennant's agents. A con-
tract was eventually signed, but Wisconsin Electrical was unable to
perform on time. Wisconsin Electrical brought suit because of the
resulting dispute.
Although these facts are strikingly similar to the facts in Lake-
side, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Pennant was subject to in per-
sonam jurisdiction in Wisconsin.56 The distinguishing factor relied
upon by the court was the two visits by Pennant's agents to Wiscon-
sin.57 On the basis of these two visits the court found that Pennant
had purposefully availed itself of the benefits and protections of
Wisconsin law, thus satisfying the requirement of Hanson v.
Denckla. 5
The conflicting outcomes of the Seventh Circuit's decisions in
Lakeside and Wisconsin Electrical illustrate the difficulty courts
have had with single contract cases. The Wisconsin Electrical
court's reliance on the two visits also illustrates the way some courts
have turned to a mechanical counting of contacts to determine juris-
diction. In short, the cases illustrate the need which courts have for
Although Mountain State in a sense caused the activity in Wisconsin by placing the
order, the contract between the parties left Lakeside in absolute control over where
it could conduct that activity, and it made this decision and conducted the activity
unilaterally. Mountain State's belief, which we may assume existed, that Lake-
wood would choose to perform its contractual obligations in Wisconsin does not
constitute an invocation of the benefits and protections of Wisconsin's laws...
597 F.2d at 603.
55. 619 F.2d 676 (7th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 679.
57. Id. at 677.
58. Id. at 677-78.
19831
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a unified approach to deciding jurisdiction in single contract cases.59
EXISTING JURISDICTION TESTS
In an attempt to develop a unified approach, several circuits
adopted tests setting forth the factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether jurisdiction could be exercised. Although all of the tests
are derived from the Supreme Court's decisions on jurisdiction, the
tests varied in complexity. The circuits, in applying their tests, also
differed in the jurisdictional value given to facts common to all sin-
gle contract cases. This section will discuss the three main tests
which have developed.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a dual test for
determining jurisdiction.6° The two factors of this test were:
(1) whether an affirmative act of the defendant had established a
minimum contact with the forum, and (2) whether it was fair and
reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and de-
fend the action.6'
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a three require-
ment test jurisdiction.62 The requirements were:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privi-
lege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in the
forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the de-
fendant's activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or
consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial
enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.63
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals developed a five factor
jurisdiction test.64 Three of the factors were considered primary:
(1) the quantity of contacts, (2) the nature and quality of the con-
tacts, and (3) the source and connection of the cause of action with
59. The Supreme Court passed up an excellent opportunity to provide guidance when it
denied certiorari in the Lakeside case. 445 U.S. 907 (1980). Justices White and Powell dis-
sented from this denial and issued a rare written dissent to it noting the conflicts between the
various state and federal decisions in single contract cases. Id. at 909-10. Justice White
argued that certiorari should have been granted to provide guidance on the issue. Id. at 910-
i.
60. Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau, 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974). The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals follows the same test. Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets,
Inc., 567 F.2d 933, 937 (10th Cir. 1977).
61. 495 F.2d at 494.
62. Southern Machine Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968).
63. Id. at 381.
64. Afianase v. Economy Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 6:1
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those contacts.65 The two remaining factors were secondary: (4) the
interest of the forum, and (5) convenience.66 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals also adopted this five factor test.67
The three tests, while differing in complexity, are all restate-
ments of the same basic principles established by the Supreme
Court. The Fifth Circuit's test is essentially a quote of the Supreme
Court's language in International Shoe and Hanson. The Sixth Cir-
cuit's and Eighth Circuit's tests are simply further delineations of
the components of those principles. In applying the three tests the
circuits have consistently looked to the same factors. The inconsis-
tency between cases from different circuits, and within individual
circuits, has resulted from the jurisdictional value given particular
facts common to all single contract cases.
The next section of this article combines the previous three tests
into a unified test. The application of that test to facts common to
all single contract cases, and the jurisdictional weight which should
be given to those facts is then discussed.
A THREE STEP TEST OF JURISDICTION
Development of any unified test is a difficult task because Inter-
national Shoe and the later Supreme Court cases set up only general
principles. Each turned upon the concerns particularly relevant to
its facts.61 The task is also difficult because the law of jurisdiction is
incapable of being reduced to mechanical rules. Jurisdiction simply
cannot be placed against a yardstick and measured.
Thus, a unified approach which presents rules of jurisdiction
against which a set of facts could be measured, will not be used in
this article. Instead, it will attempt to provide a guide to direct the
investigation and insure that all relevant factors are considered and
a reasoned decision is made.
A unified approach to the determination of jurisdiction would
consist of an investigation of the following three steps:
69
1. Whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the ben-
efits and protections of the forum state's laws.
65. Id. at 197.
66. Id.
67. Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1083 (1st Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1951).
69. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
See also Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Commercial Litigation.: When Is a Contract a Con-
tact?, 61 B.U.L. REv. 375 (1981); Note, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations Based on
a Single Act:. A New Sole for International Shoe, 47 GEO. L.J. 342 (1958-59).
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2. Whether the cause of action arose from the defendant's ac-
tions connected with the forum state.
3. Whether the exercise of jurisdiction would be consistent with
fair play and substantial justice.
These issues must be considered in sequence and each must be an-
swered affirmatively before the next may be considered. All must be
answered affirmatively before the exercise of jurisdiction is proper.
These three steps are derived from International Shoe and its
progeny. Step one is the "purposefully avails" requirement estab-
lished in Hanson v. Denckla.70 Step two, the connection require-
ment, comes from International Shoe7' and from Hanson.72
Together, steps one and two determine the existence of the mini-
mum contacts as required by International Shoe.7 Finally, step
three is taken from International Shoe.
74
APPLICATION OF THE THREE STEP TEST
The three steps of this jurisdiction test are intended to lead the
determination of jurisdiction to a review of all relevant factors pres-
ent in a single contract case. Each step is intended to review certain
factors. This section explains what the objective of each step is.
Step One: Whether the Defendant Purposefully Availed Itself
of the Benefits and Protections of the Forum State's Laws.
This step may be broken into two components. First, the de-
fendant must have performed some affirmative act which causes
consequences within the forum state. Second, the defendant's acts
must have been purposefully or foreseeably connected with the fo-
rum state so that the defendant intended to be protected by the fo-
rum state's laws. Each of these components will be discussed
separately.
The acts of the defendant which create consequences in the fo-
rum state do not have to be physically performed in the state."
Simple communication by mail should be sufficient. 76 Not all com-
70. 357 U.S. at 253. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
71. 326U.S. at 319.
72. 357 U.S. at 25 1-52.
73. 326 U.S. at 316.
74. Id. See Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
75. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
76. Id. See also Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950). But see,
Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Benjamin v. West-
ern Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830 (1973).
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munications with those within a state, however, will satisfy this
requirement.
77
In single contract cases the negotiation and execution of the
contract are always present. During negotiation the defendant has
directed communications into the forum state. Execution creates
the needed consequences due to the resulting performance of the
contract by the plaintiff in the forum state. The first component of
the first step is therefore satisfied in most single contract cases.
The second component is more difficult to fulfill. The defend-
ant's acts must have purposefully affected the forum state or the ap-
plicability of the forum state's laws must have been foreseeable from
the defendant's acts. The simple fact that the plaintiff is located in
the forum state is not sufficient to satisfy this component.78 The de-
fendant's own acts must connect him with the forum.
On this issue the circuits are in sharp conffict. One view holds
that the defendant's entry into a contract which is substantially cer-
tain to be performed by the plaintiff in the forum state is sufficient to
satisfy this requirement. 79 The defendant in such cases is presumed
to be aware that the plaintiff will perform the contract in the forum
state. An intent to be benefitted by the forum state's law is imputed
to the defendant from this knowledge. The contrary view rejects
this reasoning and holds that the performance of the contract by the
plaintiff in the forum state creates no ties between the defendant and
that state.80 These cases view the plaintiff as being free to perform
the contract in any state. The plaintiff's choice of the forum state is
entirely its own and in no way affects the defendant.
Neither approach can be relied upon to produce satisfactory
results in all instances. In those cases in which the defendant con-
tracted for the production of goods or the performance of services
with a plaintiff whose only plant is located in the forum state, it is
reasonable to impute to the defendant the knowledge that its con-
77. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
78. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Supe-
rior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
79. Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); In-
Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972); Electro-Craft
Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1969); Aftanase v. Economy
Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
80. Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v. Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Iowa Elec-
tric Light and Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 603 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1979); Lakeside Bridge &
Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Whittaker Corp.




tract will create consequences in the forum state. In contracts in
which the plaintiff is simply acting as a broker of goods acquired
from others, the plaintiff is not as limited to performance in the fo-
rum state. In such cases the defendant should not be bound by the
plaintiff's choice of the place of performance. If the plaintiff is the
purchaser and is to receive the goods or services in the forum state,
then the defendant would have actual, rather than simply implied,
knowledge that the forum state would be affected by the contract.
The investigation of this second component therefore will require a
review of the contract terms, e.g., shipment terms, references to
places of performance, designated sources of goods, and of the
parties.
If both components of step one exist, the defendant has pur-
posefully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state's laws.
An investigation of step two would then follow. If, however, either
of step one's components is not met, the defendant has not purpose-
fully availed himself of the benefits of the forum state's law. Step
two need not be investigated in that case because step one has been
answered negatively.
Step Two: Whether the Cause of Action Arose from the De-
fendant's Actions Connected with the Forum State.
This step is the easiest of the three to decide in single contract
cases. Suits for breach of contract certainly arise from the activities
surrounding the negotiation, execution, and performance of the con-
tract. Assuming that the step one investigation ended with the con-
clusion that the defendant by making the contract had availed itself
of the benefits and protections of the forum state, then a claim for
breach of that contract would arise from the acts.8 Similarly, tort
actions arising from the same acts which created the contract would
also have the necessary connection. 2 In single contract cases, then,
81. See In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d at 229.
82. Id. at 23 1. The plaintiff in In-Flight brought suit on the dual basis of breach of
contract and damage to business reputation. Id. at 222. Both causes of action arose because
the defendant stopped payment on a check given to the plaintiff as payment for goods deliv-
ered by the plaintiff to the defendant under a contract of sale. Id. at 222-23. The court
ruled:
Both acts and their consequences were made possible only by Van Dusen's transac-
tion of business with In-Flight, by its entering into a contract with In-Flight.
Under the circumstances we believe that the cause of action for damage to business




step two will always be answered affirmatively. Therefore, we turn
to step three.
Step Three: Whether the Exercise of Jurisdiction Would be
Consistent with Fair Play and Substantial Justice.
This step provides the flexibility inherent in the International
Shoe approach to jurisdiction. Here a weighing and balancing of
factors must be made. Although no definitive scale for this weigh-
ing and balancing can be established, the factors to be weighed and
balanced can at least be identified. The major factors were identi-
fied by the Supreme Court in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp.
8 3
Those factors were: (1) the burden placed on the defendant in de-
fending in the forum state," (2) the forum state's interest in adjudi-
cating the lawsuit, 85 (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient relief,86 (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining efficient resolution of controversies,87 and (5) the shared in-
terest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social
policies. 88
Burden of Defendant
The first factor mentioned, the burden placed on the defendant,
is of course the most important.89 A review of this factor must begin
with an investigation of the defendant's economic ability to defend
the suit in the forum state.90 A small business operating at a single
location in its home state may not have the resources necessary to
defend an action in a distant state. Conversely, a large corporation
with operations in numerous states would be prepared to litigate in
other than its home state. Litigation which would create an undue
hardship on the former would be an acceptable burden for the
latter.
In reviewing the burden placed on the defendant, courts com-
monly look to the defendant's status as buyer or seller in the trans-
83. 444 U.S. at 292.
84. Id.
85. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
86. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The consideration of the plaintiffs
interest is restricted by his ability to select the forum in which to pursue his claim of relief.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 (1977).
87. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.
88. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 98.
89. World- Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292.




action.9 Sellers are traditionally viewed as the dominant party in a
transaction and considered more able to defend themselves in a for-
eign jurisdiction. Buyers are viewed as passive parties unaccus-
tomed to traveling beyond the confines of their home state. The
solicitation by a non-resident seller of a goods to be brought into the
forum state is viewed as a more significant contact with the forum
state than a solicitation by a non-resident purchaser of a purchase of
goods to be shipped outside the forum state.92 Sellers, then, are
more likely to be found to be subject to foreign jurisdiction. This
distinction, while perhaps valid in some instances, should not be ac-
cepted as controlling. Instead, the court should look behind the sta-
tus of the parties to their involvement in the contractual
transaction.
93
Buyers are often categorized by courts as active or passive.94 A
buyer who actively participates in the transaction as by initiating
negotiations, specifying the design of the goods, or monitoring the
seller's performance is viewed as more closely connected with the
forum state and more subject to its jurisdiction than a buyer who
simply places an order for goods and accepts delivery. This is a
valid distinction, but should be expanded to apply to sellers as well
as buyers.
Forum State's Interest
The forum state will always have an interest in providing re-
dress for its residents.9" Additionally, the forum state will have an
interest in deciding a suit involving a contract calling for production
of goods, performance of services, or other contractual performance
91. Aaron Ferer & Sons v. Diversified Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1977).
92. Id. at 1214. See Electro-Craft Corp. v. Maxwell Electronics Corp., 417 F.2d 365
(8th Cir. 1969); McQuay, Inc. v. Samuel Schlosberg, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 902 (D. Minn. 1971);
Guardian Packaging Corp. v. Kapak Indus., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 952 (D. Minn. 1970); Oswalt
Indus., Inc. v. Gilmore, 297 F. Supp. 307 (D. Kan. 1969). But see, Mountaire Feeds, Inc. v.
Agro Impex, S.A., 677 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1982); Aaron Ferer and Sons Co. v. Diversified
Metals Corp., 564 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1977).
93. See, Pedi Bares, Inc. v. P & C Food Markets, Inc., 567 F.2d 933 (10th Cir. 1977); In-
Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1972).
94. Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079 (1st Cir. 1973); Yankee
Metal Prod. Co. v. District Court, 528 P.2d 311 (Okla. 1974). See also Note, Lakeside Bridge
& Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co.: Inflexible Application ofLong-Arm Jurisdic-
tion Standards to the Nonresident Purchaser, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 345, 353 (1980).
95. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. at 223; In-Flight Devices Corp.
v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d at 232; Thompson v. Ecological Science Corp., 421 F.2d
467, 470 (8th Cir. 1970).
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within the state.96 If the plaintiff is not a resident of the forum state
or if the contract is not to be performed there, then the forum state
does not have an interest in adjudicating the action and is unable to
hear the litigation. 97
Plaintiff's Interest
This factor focuses upon the plaintiff's economic ability to pur-
sue its claim in another state.98 This economic investigation would
be the same as that made of the defendant's ability to litigate in the
forum state.
Interstate Judicial System ' Interest
This factor closely parallels the investigation made in a consid-
eration under the doctrine of forum non-conveniens. 99 The issue
here is whether the forum state can efficiently litigate the cause of
action. The availability of witnesses, the cost of obtaining witnesses,
and access to demonstrative evidence are all factors which must be
96. In-Flight Devices Corp. v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 466 F.2d at 232; O'Hare Int'l Bank
v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1971).
97. See, e.g., World-Wide Volksrwagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286.
98. See Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92; McGee, 355 U.S. at 223.
99. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 223. The doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court
to decline to exercise jurisdiction even though the court properly has both jurisdiction and
venue over the case. Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), reversed 454
U.S. 235 (1981). The refusal to hear the case must be based upon a determination that
another court, which also has jurisdiction and venue over the case, would be a more conve-
nient court to hear the case. In determining whether a more convenient forum exists the
court must consider both the private interests of the litigants and the public interest. Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The factors which must be reviewed in a consider-
ation of the litigants' private interests are:
[T]he relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, wit-
nesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action;
and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive.
Id. at 508.
Also to be considered is the enforceability of any resulting judgment. Id. The factors
of public interest include: the necessity of applying foreign law; court congestion; imposing
jury duty upon the people of a community having no interest to the litigation. Id. at 508-09.
This doctrine has been modified somewhat for federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1976). That section states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it
might have been brought." This provision expanded upon the doctrine of forum non-con-
veniens and allowed transfer upon a lesser showing of inconvenience. Norwood v. Kirkpat-
rick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955). The factors to be reviewed to determine if transfer was proper
remained unchanged by the statute, however. Id. at 32.
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considered. No one factor is controlling. Again, a balancing of
competing concerns must be made.
States' Interest In Fundamental Substantive Social Policies
This factor considers the effect that granting or denying juris-
diction would have on social policies. An example of this is the
Supreme Court's decision in Kulko. The California court based its
finding of jurisdiction upon the father's consent to his daughter liv-
ing with her mother in California."° The Supreme Court was con-
cerned, among other things, that upholding this decision would
place an undue burden on family relations.' 0 '
A similar fear is expressed in single contract cases. The fear is
that allowing jurisdiction will interfere with and discourage inter-
state trade. 0 2 The presumption is that businesses will be hesitant to
enter into contracts with businesses located in other states because
of the possibility of being pulled into litigation in the other state.
The reverse of that presumption, however, is equally true. A corpo-
ration might be hesitant to contract with a foreign corporation for
fear that it could not obtain jurisdiction over the foreign corporation
and would have to litigate in the foreign corporation's home state.
Thus, unless some special policy applies to the facts of a particular
case, this factor should not affect the jurisdictional decision.
CONCLUSION
Single contract cases pose a special jurisdictional problem. The
flexibility inherent in the International Shoe doctrine prohibits the
development of mechanical rules to settle this jurisdictional prob-
lem. When faced with this problem, courts must be careful to inves-
tigate the case fully and make the decision based upon a
consideration of all factors. The framework set out in this article
will help guide courts through this process to a well-reasoned
decision.
100. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 89, 94.
101. Id. at 98.
102. Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th
Cir. 1979); Whittaker Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 482 F.2d 1079, 1085 (1st Cir. 1973).
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